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INTRODUCTION 
Those knowledgeable enough to be aware of the phenomenon are 
generally disturbed by the explosive growth of federal crimes, which today 
number over 4,000.1  The general public, however, has no such awareness 
and, if it did, most would likely not be concerned.  Indeed, the continuing 
political appeal of “tough on crime” policies has been driving the growth of 
federal criminal legislation.2  No one questions that government must 
provide protection from crime.  Rather, the constitutional question concerns 
which government should protect the public against which crimes.  Much 
of the public seems to be under a dual misimpression:  (1) that the federal 
government has the primary responsibility for criminal law; and (2) that 
more criminal laws translate into greater safety.3 
Popular debate about crime rarely mentions the significant differences 
between federal and state criminal laws.4  Despite the large number of 
federal crimes, federal criminal law enforcement handles only about five 
percent of total prosecutions in the country.5  The constitutional allocation 
of power which leaves general police powers in the states should mean that 
the federal role is much smaller.  Moreover, unless Congress is prepared to 
destroy the traditional role and quality of the federal courts, the number of 
federal judges cannot be increased in size for the federal judiciary to handle 
much more of a criminal caseload.6 
                                                          
 1. See JOHN S. BAKER, JR., FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR LAW & PUB. POL’Y, MEASURING THE 
EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIME LEGISLATION 3 (2004) [hereinafter FEDERALIST 
REPORT] (explaining the methodology underlying the study’s count of 4,000 federal crimes), 
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/ 
criminallaw/crimreportfinal.pdf.    
 2. See JAMES STRAZELLA ET AL., TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL 
LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 
15-16, 16 n.28 (1998) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE REPORT] (asserting that “[t]here is 
widespread recognition that a major reason for the federalization trend, even when federal 
prosecution of these crimes may not be necessary or effective, is that federal crime 
legislation is politically popular”), available at http://www.aba 
net.org/crimjust/fedcrimlaw2.pdf. 
 3. See id. at 16-17 (observing that while legislative attempts to create federal criminal 
laws are often prompted by the public’s “misguided[] perception that federal law 
enforcement efforts are necessary or even appropriate to deal with a particular law 
enforcement problem[,]” realistically, federal criminal law can only address a small number 
of local crimes at any given time). 
 4. See id. at 14 (asserting that countless authors have observed the lack of justification 
for Congress’ desire to create federal criminal law that merely duplicates state criminal law). 
 5. See PATRICK A. LANGAN & JODI M. BROWN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN NO. NCJ-165149, FELONY SENTENCES IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1994 2 (1997) (comparing federal and state felony convictions for various crimes in 1994), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fsus94.pdf. 
 6. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 37 (arguing that a significant 
increase in the number of federal judges “threatens the coherence of circuit law, risks 
reduction in the quality of appointments as the degree of individual scrutiny given to the 
selection and confirmation of large numbers of candidates declines, and impairs the close 
working relationships essential to the deliberations within multi-judge courts”). 
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Members of Congress seem not to care, or at least, not to be aware that 
creating new federal crimes does little, if anything, to protect the general 
public from crime.7  Some new federal crimes do protect special economic 
interests.8  The general public, however, seems to feel that more federal 
crime protection means protection from violent crimes and theft.9  That, 
however, was not the case even following September 11th, when new 
legislation primarily concerned matters of evidence gathering and 
procedure.10  Regardless of these realities, too many members of Congress 
seem primarily concerned that voters believe these new federal criminal 
laws are protecting them.  Given the mythology that surrounds the crime 
issue, anyone concerned about the growth of federal criminal law is hard 
pressed to know what can be done even to slow the pace. 
This Article explores remedies for the overexpansion of federal criminal 
law.  Part I establishes that the expansion of federal criminal law continues 
unabated.  This Article then considers three points at which it may be 
possible to achieve some slowing of the expansion of federal criminal law.  
Part II suggests that lower federal courts could, as a few courts have done, 
recognize as-applied challenges to federal crimes.  This would take 
seriously language in Lopez v. United States11 and Morrison v. United 
States,12 which establishes a basis for jurisdiction in each case under a 
statute based on the Commerce Clause.  Part III argues that the Supreme 
Court could more clearly distinguish between criminal and non-criminal 
statutes under the Commerce Clause.  That would focus on the separation 
of powers issue of Congress imposing unconstitutional jurisdiction on the 
federal courts.  Finally, Part IV asserts that the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) should be forced, as a matter of separation of powers, to discontinue 
the practice of “detailing” attorneys to the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
where they have participated in drafting criminal legislation.  With 
Congress unwilling to respect the constraints of federalism and separation 
of powers on the creation of federal criminal statutes, lawyers and judges 
might want to consider additional approaches to enforcing those 
                                                          
 7. See id. at 20, 22 (observing that several recently enacted federal statutes, 
championed by many because they would have a claimed impact on crime, have hardly been 
used at all). 
 8. See, e.g., Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839) (criminalizing economic espionage and the theft of 
proprietary trade secrets). 
 9. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the limited ability of the 
federal government to prosecute crimes traditionally handled by the states). 
 10. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, The USA-Patriot Act and the American Response to 
Terror:  Can We Protect Civil Liberties After September 11th?, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 
1510 (2002) (discussing the expansion of law enforcement’s right to engage in trap and 
trace, pen register, and sneak and peek procedures under the United States Patriot Act). 
 11. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 12. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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constitutional limits. 
I. THE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW13 
The expansion of federal criminal law has been well documented.  As 
found by a 1998 American Bar Association Task Force on the 
Federalization of Crime,14 the growth of federal criminal law has been 
“startling.”  The Task Force’s research revealed that “[m]ore than 40% of 
the federal [criminal] provisions enacted since the Civil War have been 
enacted since 1970.”15 In 2004, the Federalist Society (“Federalist Report”) 
measured the growth in federal criminal law since the ABA Report and 
determined that the rate of growth in federal criminal law had continued at 
the same pace.  The 2004 report concluded that the United States Code 
includes over 4,000 offenses which carry a criminal penalty.16   
Documenting the precise contours of federal criminal law has proved 
difficult,17 because getting an accurate count of federal crimes is not as 
simple as counting the number of criminal statutes.18  According to the 
ABA Report, “[s]o large is the present body of federal criminal law that 
there is no conveniently accessible, complete list of federal crimes.”19  
Moreover, federal criminal statutes are scattered throughout the U.S. Code 
and are highly complex.20  For example, “[o]ne statutory section can 
                                                          
 13. Part I presents an abridged version of this author’s research and conclusions from a 
report originally commissioned and published by the Federalist Society for Law and Public 
Policy Studies.  See FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1. 
 14. The author was a member of the Task Force. 
 15. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 7 (emphasis in original).  The ABA 
Task Force further noted that “more than a quarter of the federal criminal provisions enacted 
since the Civil War have been enacted within a sixteen year period since 1980.”  Id. at 7 n.9. 
 16. FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 12. 
 17. See id. at 4-10 (discussing the problems inherent in counting federal crimes and the 
various methodologies used to do so).  See generally Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal 
Code Reform:  Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 45 (1998) [hereinafter Gainer, Past 
and Future]; Ronald L. Gainer, Report to the Attorney General on Federal Criminal Code 
Reform, 1 CRIM. L.F. 99 (1989) [hereinafter Gainer, Report to the Attorney General]. 
 18. In theory, federal crimes are strictly statutory, and the federal system does not 
include common law crimes.  See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 
32 (1812) (finding that federal courts lack common law criminal jurisdiction).  Locating 
purely common-law crimes would require consulting judicial opinions.  Even then 
determining what is and is not a common-law crime is problematic.  See WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1(e), at 109-16 (2003).  So, given that all 
federal crimes must be statutory, it would seem that it should simply be a matter of counting 
all the statutes which are designated as crimes.  As further discussed in the text, this is not 
the case. 
 19. FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 4, 13 n.3 (quoting ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 9). 
 20. See id. (citing ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 93).  As noted elsewhere 
in the Federalist Report, an exact count of the present “number” of federal crimes contained 
in the statutes, let alone those contained in administrative regulations, is difficult to achieve 
and, even then, the count is subject to varying interpretations.  In part, the reason is not only 
that the criminal provisions are now so numerous and their location in the books so 
scattered, but also that federal criminal statutes are often complex.  One statutory section 
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comprehend a variety of actions, potentially multiplying the number of 
federal ‘crimes’ that could be enumerated.”21  This situation presents a two-
fold challenge:22  (1) determining what statutes contain as crimes;23 and (2) 
differentiating whether a single statute with different acts listed within a 
section or subsection includes more than a single crime and, if so, how 
many.24 
The first difficulty involves the failure of federal law to establish a 
means of comprehensively identifying the statutes that include crimes.  
Federal law does not provide a general definition of the term “crime.”  Title 
18 of the U.S. Code, although designated “Crimes and Criminal 
Procedure,” is not a comprehensive criminal code.  It is simply a collection 
of statutes, which contains many, but not all, of the federal crimes.25  Other 
crimes are distributed throughout the other forty-nine titles of the U.S. 
Code.26 
                                                          
can comprehend a variety of actions, potentially multiplying the number of federal “crimes” 
that could be enumerated.  For example, the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 encompasses 
bank robbery, extortion, theft, assaults, killing hostages, and storing or selling anything of 
value knowing it to have been taken from a bank.  Depending on how this subdivisible and 
dispersed law is counted, the true number of federal crimes multiplies. 
 21. Id. at 13 n.4. 
For example, the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 encompasses bank robbery, 
extortion, theft, assaults, killing hostages, and storing or selling anything of value 
knowing it to have been taken from a bank . . . .  Depending on how all this 
subdivisible and dispersed law is counted, the true number of federal crimes 
multiplies. 
Id. (citing ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 93). 
 22. Id. at 4. 
 23. See id. (citing ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-10) (observing that 
federal law does not effectively define crimes, and thus, administrative regulations and 
penalties designated as “civil” could also be considered criminal statutes).  Moreover, 
although Title 18 of the U.S. Code purports to lay out federal criminal law, it does not 
comprise the complete body of federal crimes.  Id.; see also Gainer, Past and Future, supra 
note 17, at 53 (observing that only 1,200 of the then more than 3,300 federal criminal 
provisions were contained within Title 18). 
 24. See FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 4 (“[O]ne statute does not necessarily 
equal one crime.”).  “For example, 20 U.S.C. § 9573 criminalizes knowing disclosure, 
publication, and use of confidential student data.  This could arguably be counted as one 
offense, or as many as three offenses[.]”  Id. at 13 n.9.  Thus, different scholars will reach 
different counts depending on how many individual crimes they find in a particular statute.  
Id. at 4. 
 25. See Gainer, Past and Future, supra note 17, at 53. 
The federal statutory law today is set forth in the 50 titles of the United States 
Code. Those 50 titles encompass roughly 27,000 pages of printed text. Within 
those 27,000 pages, there appear approximately 3,300 separate provisions that 
carry criminal sanctions for their violation. Over 1,200 of those provisions are 
found jumbled together in Title 18, euphemistically referred to as the ‘Federal 
Criminal Code,’ and the remainder are found scattered throughout the other 49 
titles. The judicial interpretations of those provisions, which are necessary for their 
understanding, are found within the printed volumes reporting the opinions issued 
by judges in federal cases—volumes which now total over 2,800 and which contain 
approximately 4,000,000 printed pages. 
Id.  
 26. There are fifty titles, but two titles, 6 and 34, currently contain no un-repealed 
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Until repealed in 1984, Section 1 of Title 18 began by classifying 
offenses into felonies and misdemeanors, with a sub-class of misdemeanors 
denominated “petty offenses.”  Later amendments re-introduced 
classifications elsewhere in Title 18.27  The repeal and later amendments 
were tied to the Sentencing Act of 198928 and the creation of the United 
States Sentencing Commission.  “Congress’ basic goal . . . was to move the 
Sentencing System in the direction of uniformity.”29  Unfortunately, the 
focus on sentencing has done nothing to solve, and probably has 
exacerbated, the problem of determining just what should be counted as 
“crimes.”  In particular, that has been a problem for offenses not listed in 
Title 18, which are often regulatory or tort-like. 
The second problem is that, whether contained in Title 18 or some other 
title, one statute does not necessarily equal one crime.  Often, a single 
statute contains several crimes.  Determining the number of crimes 
contained within a single statute involves a matter of judgment.  Various 
people using different criteria are likely to disagree about the number of 
crimes contained in many statutes.  In the absence of a definition of crime, 
the count depends on the criteria employed to determine what counts as a 
crime.30 
The most comprehensive effort to count the number of federal crimes 
was conducted by the Office of Legal Policy (“OLP”) in the U.S. 
Department of Justice during the early 1980s, in connection with the effort 
to pass the proposed Federal Criminal Code.31  Mr. Ronald Gainer, 
Associate Deputy Attorney General, who oversaw these efforts and 
published an article, citing “approximately 3,000 federal crimes,” a number 
which has been much cited since.32  In a later article, Mr. Gainer raised the 
figure to “approximately 3,300 separate provisions that carry criminal 
sanctions for their violation.”33  The latter number was based on a count 
                                                          
statutes.    
 27. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3581 (2000);  18 U.S.C. § 3156(3) (2000). 
 28. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2000).  
 29. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 761 (2005).  
 30. The criteria primarily depend on how separate acts are counted.  Where one statute 
punishes several acts, do each of the several acts constitute various ways to commit a single 
crime or do they constitute a separate crime for each act?  In general, the OLP Report and 
the Federalist Report made judgments based on whether the act was or was not a traditional 
common-law crime, e.g., larceny or burglary.  Every act within a section or subsection, 
which constituted a common-law crime, was designated as a separate crime, even multiple 
acts contained in the same section or subsection, which were not common-law crimes, were 
counted as a single crime.   See FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 7, 17. 
 31. The proposal for a new Federal Criminal Code was introduced in the 93rd 
Congress, and the effort to enact such legislation lasted for about a dozen years.  See 
generally Mathews & Sullivan, Criminal Liability for Violations of the Federal Securities 
Laws: The National Commission’s Proposed Federal Criminal Code, S. 1 and S. 1400, 11 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 883 (973). 
 32. Gainer, Report to the Attorney General, supra note 17, at 94. 
 33. Gainer, Past and Future, supra note 17, at 54 n.8. 
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done by the Buffalo Criminal Law Center, “employing somewhat different 
measures.”34 
The ABA Report noted that the 3,000 number was “surely outdated by 
the large number of new federal crimes enacted in the 16 or so years since 
its estimation.”35  Focusing on the growth in federal criminal law, the ABA 
Report set out only to measure the growth of federal criminal legislation 
enacted over periods of time.  The ABA Task Force realized that it could 
not “undertake a section by section review of every printed federal 
statutory section,” which was too “massive” for its “limited purpose.”36  It 
would have had to review 27,000 pages of statutes.37  Instead, the ABA 
Report compiled a list of statutes from several sources38 and then measured 
the annual growth of federal criminal statutes.  The ABA Report did not 
determine how many new crimes were contained in each statute.39  That 
produced measures of the growth of federal criminal statutes since the Civil 
War, with particular emphasis on the period from 1970 through 1996.40 
The Federalist Report updated the ABA statutory count for the 
intervening years as the basis for estimating the total number of federal 
crimes.  Building on the methodology used in the ABA Report, the 
Federalist Report continued the count of federal criminal statutes enacted 
for the years 1997 through 2003.  From these numbers, the Federalist 
Report used the rate of growth in federal crimes to update the OLP count.  
The OLP figure, based on the most comprehensive count, was a complete 
count as of the early 1980s.  Still, the OLP count was something of an 
estimate, as reflected in its qualified statement of “approximately 3,000 
crimes.”  Given that it had to employ certain judgments about how many 
crimes are contained in a particular statute, the OLP count did not put forth 
a precise number.  The Federalist Report explained the criteria used to 
make judgments about what counts as a separate crime.41  Using the OLP 
figure of “approximately 3,000” and a rate of growth of twenty-five percent 
from then to 2000, the Federalist Report concluded that the number of 
federal offenses carrying a criminal penalty was over 4,000,42 given that 
federal criminal legislation continues to grow.43 
                                                          
 34. Id. 
 35. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT,  supra note 2, at 94. 
 36. Id. at 92. 
 37. Id. at 92. 
 38. Id. at 91-92. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 5-12. 
 41. FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.  To demonstrate the problem, the Appendix 
in the Federalist Report counts the crimes contained in the statutes enacted since 1996.  The 
count lays out the criteria upon which judgments were made.  
 42. Id.  at 3, 12.  
 43. Id.  at 8.  
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Measuring the rate of growth confirms that Congress continues to 
expand federal criminal law at a brisk pace.  As practitioners in the field 
know well, however, the number of criminal statutes does not tell the 
whole story.  No matter how many crimes Congress enacts, it remains for 
federal prosecutors to decide which statutes to invoke when proceeding to 
an indictment.  Many of the new crimes serve no other purpose than to 
make Congress look good with particular groups and/or on popular issues.  
The statutory provisions declared unconstitutional in Lopez44 and 
Morrison45 fit that description.  Many new federal criminal statutes are 
rarely used, suggesting that they are unneeded.  Federal prosecutors rely on 
certain favorites, notably mail and wire fraud statutes,46 which they use 
even when other statutes might be more appropriate.47 
The fact that many statutes are rarely prosecuted, however, does not 
mean that the addition of more crimes lacks consequences.48  The federal 
government is supposedly a government of limited powers and, therefore, 
limited jurisdiction.  Every new crime expands the jurisdiction of federal 
law enforcement and federal courts.49   Although a statute may rarely be 
used to indict, it is available to establish the legal basis upon which to show 
probable cause that a crime has been committed and, therefore, to authorize 
a search and seizure.50  The availability of more crimes also affords the 
prosecutor more discretion and, therefore, greater leverage against 
defendants.51  Increasing the number and variety of charges tends to 
                                                          
 44. See Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000) (prohibiting the 
knowing possession of a firearm in a school zone); see also id. § 922(q)(1) (enumerating 
Congress’s jurisdictional findings). 
 45. See Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000) (establishing a federal 
cause of action for gender-motivated crimes of violence). 
 46. See Mail Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000) (criminalizing mail frauds and swindles); 
id. § 1343 (criminalizing fraud by wire, radio, or television). 
 47. See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud:  The 
Changing Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435, 437-38 (1995) (discussing 
the broad reach of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes to prosecute crimes that were 
traditionally dealt with at the state level). 
 48. FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 9; see also ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra 
note 2, at 24-43 (discussing the adverse effects of the federalization of crime, even though 
many of the crimes are rarely prosecuted).  The ABA Task Force lists several adverse 
consequences, including:  (1) undermining the constitutionally-established role of the states 
as the primary enforcers of criminal law; (2) expanding “federal investigative power”; and 
(3) establishing a dual criminal justice system where the same conduct is subject to differing 
criminal penalties at the state and federal levels.  Id. at 26-31. 
 49. See FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 9; see, e.g., Renee M. Landers, 
Legislating Federal Crime and Its Consequences:  Prosecutorial Limits on Overlapping 
Federal and State Jurisdiction, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 64, 65 (1996) 
(noting that many of the statutes recently enacted by Congress “expand federal court 
jurisdiction into areas previously the sole responsibility of the states”). 
 50. FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. 
 51. Id. (“Increasing the number and variety of charges tends to dissuade defendants 
from fighting the charges, because [they] can usually be ‘clipped’ for something.”); see, 
e.g., R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines:  
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dissuade defendants from fighting the charges, because they usually can be 
“clipped” for something. 
Finally, no count of crimes in the statutes takes account of  the expansion 
of federal criminal law that occurs without new legislation.  Federal 
prosecutors regularly stretch the application of existing statutes.52  
Consider, for example, the prosecution of Arthur Andersen LLP, the appeal 
of which the Supreme Court granted certiorari.53  As in United States v. 
Arthur Andersen, LLP, federal courts often cooperate with prosecutors and 
make new law retroactively.54  What (then) Professor and (later federal 
Judge) John Noonan wrote in 1984 about bribery and public corruption 
continues to be generally true, namely that federal prosecutors and federal 
judges have been effectively creating a common law of crimes through 
expansive interpretations.55 
II.  AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES TO JURISDICTION BASED ON THE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE 
In order to enforce limits on the federalization of crime, Lopez56 and 
Morrison57 have articulated an analytic framework for determining when 
Congress exceeds its power under the Commerce Clause.58  That 
framework assumes the availability of as-applied challenges to facially 
valid federal crimes enacted under the Commerce Clause.  A few appellate 
decisions, most notably United States v. Stewart,59 have recognized such 
                                                          
Psychological and Policy Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 739, 749 
(2001) (claiming that “prosecutors can, and often do, manipulate the number of charges 
against a defendant as a way to pressure him or her into agreeing to a plea bargain”). 
 52. FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. 
 53. See United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 302 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(affirming the conviction of Arthur Anderson, LLP for obstructing Securities and Exchange 
Commission proceedings), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 823 (2005); see also John S. Baker, Jr., 
An Injustice in Houston, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2002, at A16 [hereinafter Baker, Jr. Injustice] 
(arguing that U.S. District Judge Harmon made “new law as to the proof required on the 
critical element” of the crime in the Arthur Andersen prosecution when “she gave the jury a 
very debatable interpretation” of the law “at the request of the Justice Department”).    
 54. See Baker, Jr., Injustice, supra note 53 (discussing the dangers of federal judges and 
federal prosecutors making new law outside of the legislative process).  “[A]s the Supreme 
Court long ago held, but has since often ignored, federal judges do not have the power to 
create new crimes; only Congress can do so.”  Id.  Moreover, the Ex Post Facto Clause of 
the Constitution would have prevented Congress from stretching the law as Judge Harmon 
did retroactively in Andersen.  Id. 
 55. FEDERALIST REPORT, supra note 1, at 10; see also JOHN NOONAN, BRIBES 585-86, 
620 (1984) (contending that “broad federal statutes and judicial self-confidence” have 
effectively removed the two-century-old black letter law that there is no federal common 
law of crimes). 
 56. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 57. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 58. See id. at 608 (observing that under the Commerce Clause, Congress exercises 
legislative authority over “‘three broad categories of activity’”) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
558). 
 59. 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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as-applied challenges.60  As suggested by the analytic framework of Lopez 
and Morrison, not only Congress, but also federal prosecutors, must 
establish that the prohibited activity falls within the limits of the Commerce 
Clause. 
A. The Analytic Framework of Lopez and Morrison 
In this Supreme Court term, in Ashcroft v. Raich,61 the Court is 
considering a challenge to a federal criminal prohibition on the use of 
home-grown marijuana, permitted under California law for medical use.62  
Raich requires the Court to revisit the framework developed in Lopez and 
Morrison in a situation much closer to Wickard v. Filburn63 than either of 
the prior two cases.  Wickard allows Congress to regulate local commerce 
that, aggregated together, “substantially affects” interstate commerce.64  
The interpretation of that principle lies at the heart of Lopez and Morrison. 
The analytic framework begins with the proposition that, under the 
Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate three broad categories:  (1) “the 
channels of interstate commerce”; (2) “instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce”; and (3) “activities 
that substantially affect interstate commerce.”65  Both Lopez and Morrison 
involve the third category.66  Both cases reject the argument that the 
situation should be governed by Wickard’s cumulative effects principle.67  
Accordingly, they consider factors which cabin the cumulative effects 
principle. 
Lopez observes that the Gun-Free School Zones Act68 “by its terms has 
nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise,” and 
                                                          
 60. See id. at 1141-42 (“[D]eterminations that statutes are facially invalid properly 
occur only as logical outgrowths of rulings on whether statutes may be applied to particular 
litigants on particular facts.”) (quoting Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial 
Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1327-28 (2000)). 
 61. 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 2909 (2004). 
 62. See id. at 1234.  In Raich, the Ninth Circuit ordered the entry of a preliminary 
injunction prohibiting the federal government from enforcing the Controlled Substances Act 
against the plaintiffs after finding that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of 
their claim.  Id. 
 63. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 64. Id. at 125 (“[E]ven if [the] activity [is] local and though it may not be regarded as 
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial 
economic effect on interstate commerce.”). 
 65. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). 
 66. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 609 (2000) (noting that Congress 
justified the civil remedy provisions of the Violence Against Women Act as a regulation of 
activity substantially affecting interstate commerce); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (finding that 
the Gun-Free School Zones Act did not seek to regulate the channels or instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce or persons or things in interstate commerce). 
 67. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 68. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (2000). 
BAKER 10/3/2005  1:39 PM 
2005] LIMITING THE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL CRIMES 555 
thus is not governed by the aggregation principle.69  The second point, and 
the most important for present purposes as elaborated below, concerns 
jurisdiction.  Finally, the opinion discusses the lack of any congressional 
findings, which might have compensated for the failure to include a 
jurisdictional element.70 
Regardless of whether congressional findings save the facial 
constitutionality of a federal crime which lacks a jurisdictional element, 
Lopez requires a “case-by-case inquiry” regarding jurisdiction.71  The Court 
emphasized this point:   
For example, in United States v. Bass, . . . the Court interpreted former 
18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), which made it a crime for a felon to ‘receive[e], 
posses[s], or transport[t] in commerce or affecting commerce . . . any 
firearm.’ . . . The Court interpreted the possession component of § 
1202(a) to require an additional nexus to interstate commerce both 
because the statute was ambiguous and because ‘unless Congress 
conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly 
changed the federal-state balance.’ . . .  The Bass Court set aside the 
conviction because, although the Government had demonstrated that 
Bass had possessed a firearm, it had failed ‘to show the requisite nexus 
with interstate commerce.’72   
The Court distinguished proof of jurisdiction in the particular case from the 
overall constitutionality of the statute.   
The Court thus interpreted the statute to reserve the constitutional 
question whether Congress could regulate, without more, the ‘mere 
possession’ of firearms . . . ‘The principle is old and deeply imbedded in 
our jurisprudence that this Court will construe a statute in a manner that 
requires decision of serious constitutional questions only if the statutory 
language leaves no reasonable alternative’ . . . Unlike the statute in Bass, 
§ 922(q) has no express jurisdictional element which might limit its 
reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally have an 
explicit connection with or effect on interstate commerce.73 
Morrison elaborated the three points covered in Lopez into four factors.74  
It considered whether:  (1) the activity at which the statute is directed is 
commercial or economic in nature;75 (2) the statute contains an express 
                                                          
 69. 514 U.S. at 561. 
 70. See id. at 562-63 (noting Congress’s failure to discuss its legislative judgment as to 
how the regulated activity affects interstate commerce). 
 71. See id. at 561 (“[Section] 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element which would 
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects 
interstate commerce.”). 
 72. Id. at 561-62 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted). 
 73. Id. at 562 (emphasis added and internal citations omitted). 
 74. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-13 (2000) (reflecting on the main 
points that the Court considered in its Lopez decision). 
 75. Id. at 610-11. 
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jurisdictional element involving interstate activity that might limit its 
reach;76 (3) Congress has made specific findings regarding the effects of 
the prohibited activity on interstate commerce;77 and (4) the link between 
the prohibited conduct and its purported substantial effect on interstate 
commerce is attenuated.78  The fourth factor reiterated Lopez’s rejection of 
the “but-for” reasoning about the “costs of crime” and “national 
productivity” arguments put forth by the dissent.79  Like the first factor, the 
fourth represented a containment of Wickard.80 
Morrison held that the Commerce Clause did not provide Congress with 
the authority to enact the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against 
Women Act.81  First, the provision was not a regulation of activity that 
substantially affects interstate commerce.82  Second, it lacked a 
jurisdictional requirement.83  Third, even though Congress had made 
factual findings regarding jurisdiction, these findings did not save the 
statute’s constitutionality.84  The Court did not specifically discuss the 
fourth factor, attenuation, but that factor was reflected in the references 
rejecting “but for reasoning”85 and “aggregate effect” reasoning.86 
B. Jurisdiction and As-Applied Challenges 
The availability of as-applied challenges is often overlooked, as recently 
illustrated by the opinions in United States v. Booker—a case dealing with 
                                                          
 76. Id. at 611-12. 
 77. Id. at 612. 
 78. Id. at 612-13. 
 79. See id. at 612-13 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)); see 
also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 619-24 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 80. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-18 (acknowledging that intrastate violence may have 
an effect on interstate commerce but noting that regulation of violent crime has always been 
a function of the state’s police power and concluding that Congress may not regulate 
“noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on 
interstate commerce”); see also Bradford C. Mank, Can Congress Regulate Interstate 
Endangered Species Under the Commerce Clause?  The Split in the Circuits Over Whether 
the Regulated Activity is Private Commercial Development or the Taking of a Protected 
Species, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 923, 947 (2004) (noting that Morrison and Lopez limited 
Wickard’s aggregation theory to economic activities). 
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000). 
 82. 529 U.S. at 613. 
 83. Id. at 611-12 (“Such a jurisdictional element may establish that the enactment is in 
pursuance of Congress’s regulation of interstate commerce.”). 
 84. Id. at 614-15 (“Congress’ findings are substantially weakened by the fact that they 
rely so heavily on a method of reasoning that we have already rejected as unworkable if we 
are to maintain the Constitution’s enumeration of powers.”). 
 85. Id. at 615-16 (“The reasoning that petitioners advance seeks to follow the but-for 
causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime . . . to every attenuated effect upon 
interstate commerce.”). 
 86. Id. at 617 (rejecting “the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, 
violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate 
commerce”). 
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sentencing guidelines.87 After a majority of the Supreme Court declared 
sentencing enhancements based on judge fact-finding a violation of the 
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial,88 a different majority declared two 
sections of the guidelines unconstitutional.89  Justice Thomas, dissenting on 
the remedy, argued that the Court should have adhered to its usual practice 
of rendering only an as-applied ruling.90  The other dissenters on the 
remedy also argued that this case did not call for a ruling of facial 
unconstitutionality.91  Both dissents made the point that, under the Court’s 
jurisprudence, the unconstitutionality of the specific application does not 
mean that the statute (or any part of it) is facially unconstitutional.92  
Conversely, it would follow that the fact that a statute is facially 
constitutional does not preclude the possibility that particular applications 
will be unconstitutional. 
The most familiar examples of the distinction between facial and as-
applied challenges occur under the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, 
usually in the context of speech.93  The standard for facial challenges on 
vagueness grounds is a matter of dispute within the Supreme Court.94  
                                                          
 87. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). 
 88. Id. at 756 (Stevens, J., with Scalia, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting the 
majority as to the constitutional question) (requiring that all facts that affect sentencing “be 
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
 89. Id. at 764 (Breyer, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ., 
constituting the majority as to the remedy) (invalidating the provisions of the federal 
sentencing guidelines “that require[] sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the 
applicable Guidelines range” and “that set[] forth standards of review on appeal, including 
de novo review of departures from the applicable Guidelines range”). 
 90. Id. at 795 (Thomas, J., dissenting as to the remedy) (maintaining that when a 
particular application of a statute is unconstitutional, but the statute itself is not, the Court 
typically invalidates only the application and not the statute itself).  According to Justice 
Thomas:  “Absent an exception such as First Amendment overbreadth, we will facially 
invalidate a statute only if the plaintiff establishes that the statute is invalid in all of its 
applications.”  Id. (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). 
 91. Id. at 777 (Stevens, J., with Souter, J., dissenting as to the remedy, joined by Scalia, 
J., except for Part III and footnote 17).  “Neither section is unconstitutional.  While these 
provisions can in certain cases, when combined with other statutory and Guidelines 
provisions, result in a violation of the Sixth Amendment, they are plainly constitutional on 
their faces.”  Id. 
 92. See id. at 795 (Thomas, J., dissenting as to the remedy) (noting that where the 
statute is unconstitutional “as applied,” the statute is struck down only as it applies to a 
specific litigant, not on its face); id. at 777 (Stevens, J., with Souter, J., dissenting as to the 
remedy, joined by Scalia, J., except for Part III and footnote 17) (stating that while the 
statutory provisions could violate the Sixth Amendment, those provisions remain facially 
constitutional). 
 93. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1022-1039 
(2d ed. 1988) (providing that “overbreadth analysis . . . compares the statutory line defining 
burdened and unburdened conduct with the judicial line specifying activities protected and 
unprotected by the First Amendment”). 
 94. Compare Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 (maintaining that to succeed on a facial 
challenge, “the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the 
Act would be valid”), and City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 
789, 796 (1984) (stating that a statute is facially invalid if “it is unconstitutional in every 
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Nevertheless, in order for a plaintiff to secure either an as-applied or a 
facial ruling, the statute must be unconstitutional as applied to the 
plaintiff.95  Overbreadth challenges, on the other hand, depart from the 
normal rule.96  Such challenges need only establish that the statute suffers 
from substantial overbreadth.97  Indeed, successful challenges often cannot 
establish that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the specific 
plaintiff.98 
As for the Commerce Clause, an as-applied challenge might appear to be 
at odds with Wickard, in which the point seemed to be that the individual 
activity by itself did not fall within the scope of the Commerce Clause.99  
Wickard, a non-criminal case, rests on the “market concept”—specifically 
in that case a national market for wheat.100  As discussed above, the 
Lopez/Morrison framework explicitly makes the “aggregation” or 
“cumulative effects” principle generally inapplicable to criminal cases.101  
As Morrison observes:  “While we need not adopt a categorical rule against 
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these 
cases, thus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce 
Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic 
in nature.”102  So even if Raich applies Wickard’s market aggregation 
principle to home-grown marijuana as having a “substantial effect” on a 
national market for marijuana, that would have no impact on the validity of 
as-applied challenges to crimes involving non-economic activity. 
                                                          
conceivable application”), with City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999) 
(“To the extent we have consistently articulated a clear standard for facial challenges, it is 
not the Salerno formulation, which has never been a decisive factor in any decision of this 
Court . . . .”).  See also Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 773 n.1 (Stevens, J., with Souter, J., dissenting 
as to the remedy, joined by Scalia, J., except for Part III and footnote 17) (noting that the 
Court continues to debate the proper standard for facial challenges). 
 95. See TRIBE, supra note 93, at 1036 (reporting that a party asserting unconstitutional 
vagueness must either demonstrate that the challenged statute is vague as applied to the 
particular party or vague as applied to everyone) (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 753-
58 (1974)). 
 96. Id. at 1035 (“Overbreadth analysis is often perceived as an exception to the rule that 
an individual is not ordinarily permitted to litigate the rights of third parties . . . .”). 
 97. Id. at 1024. 
 98. See id. at 1035 (“Those whose expression is ‘chilled’ by the existence of an 
overbroad or unduly vague statute cannot be expected to adjudicate their own rights, lacking 
by definition the willingness to disobey the law.”) (citing Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 
521 (1972)). 
 99. See 317 U.S. 111, 124, 127-28 (1942) (“That appellee’s own contribution to the 
demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove [his conduct] from the 
scope of federal regulation.”). 
 100. Id. at 125-29 (justifying regulation of wheat under Congress’s commerce power 
with the explanation that a national market for wheat exists, and that even “wheat consumed 
on the farm where grown, if wholly outside the scheme of regulation, would have a 
substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at 
increased prices”). 
 101. See supra Part II. 
 102. 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). 
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In United States v. McCoy,103 Judge Stephen Trott raised in dissent the 
issue of as-applied challenges.  He argued that Lopez had foreclosed as-
applied challenges:   
My colleagues have finessed an unavoidable issue in this case: whether 
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) is unconstitutional on its face. They have 
attempted to restrict their holding to McCoy and to others ‘similarly 
situated,’ but it is not clear to me that the law permits such a limitation. I 
so conclude because McCoy’s conduct clearly falls within the language 
of the statute, and because the Supreme Court appears under such 
circumstances to have ruled out ‘as applied’ challenges in Commerce 
Clause cases. In my view, if the conduct under review falls within the 
plain language of the statute, precedent requires us to take the statute 
head on, not carve pieces out of it . . . 
The reason why I believe the majority's approach is not viable is simple:  
the Supreme Court said in Lopez that ‘where a general regulatory statute 
bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of 
individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’ . . . I 
take this passage in Lopez to mean here precisely what it says: the de 
minimis nexus of Rhonda McCoy’s personal activity to interstate 
commerce is of ‘no consequence,’ so long as (1) her conduct falls within 
the purview of the statute, as she has stipulated, and (2) the statute itself 
which covers that activity is valid.  The Court in Lopez articulated this 
clarification to make it clear that although Congress may not use a 
‘relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad general 
regulation of state or private activities,’ if the general regulatory statute 
at issue does bear a substantial relation to commerce, an ‘as applied’ 
challenge is inappropriate.104   
In United States v. Stewart,105 Judge Alex Kozinski responded that Lopez 
did not preclude as-applied challenges.   
The dissent in McCoy asserted that as-applied challenges cannot be 
brought under the Commerce Clause, relying on a single sentence from 
Lopez for support:  ‘[W]here a general regulatory statute bears a 
substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual 
instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’ . . .  The 
McCoy dissent took this sentence entirely out of context. 
Lopez itself borrowed this sentence from a footnote in Maryland v. Wirtz 
. . . a case that had nothing to do with as-applied challenges, but instead 
announced the so called ‘enterprise concept,’ which allows Congress to 
exercise authority over a large enterprise or industry by regulating its 
                                                          
 103. 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003).  McCoy was followed in United States v. Maxwell, 
386 F.3d 1042 (11th Cir. 2004), which held that 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) was 
unconstitutional as applied.  Id. at 1063. 
 104. Id. at 1133-34 (Trott, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 105. 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003). 
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smaller components, even those components that bear no relation to 
interstate commerce on their own. 106 
Judge Kozinski further explained that all constitutional challenges are as-
applied, and that they are the “basic building blocks” of constitutional 
litigation: 
                                                          
 106. Id. at 1140.  Judge Kozinski’s opinion continued: 
Wirtz held that Congress could regulate a group of employees who had no direct 
connection to interstate commerce, reasoning that labor-related “strife disrupting an 
enterprise involved in commerce may disrupt commerce,” and that “substandard 
labor conditions among any group of employees, whether or not they are personally 
engaged in commerce or production, may lead to strife disrupting an entire 
enterprise.”  The Court in Wirtz was careful to explain that, although the 
employees’ activities were not themselves in interstate commerce, Congress had 
reasonably determined they had a material effect on interstate commerce because 
of their participation in the larger enterprise.  The Court employed a similar mode 
of analysis in Wickard.  It held that, though Wickard's homegrown wheat may not 
have traveled interstate, it had a material effect on the interstate price of wheat:  
“[T]aken together with [the homegrown wheat] of many others similarly situated,” 
it had an aggregate effect on commerce that was “far from trivial.”   
Read in context, the sentence quoted by the McCoy dissent can only mean that, 
where a general regulatory statute governs a large enterprise, it does not matter that 
its components have a de minimis relation to interstate commerce on their own.  
What does matter is that the components could disrupt the enterprise, and could 
thus interfere with interstate commerce.  In the Wirtz situation, then, the enterprise 
is the mechanism through which a multitude of the intrastate effects are 
consolidated and amplified so that they have an effect on interstate commerce.  
This obviously has no bearing at all on a case such as ours where the activity in 
question is not part of a large enterprise that itself has an effect on interstate 
commerce.  
Our Commerce Clause jurisprudence supports this reading.  Before cases like 
Wirtz, the Court drew a much sharper line between local and interstate commerce, 
holding that certain activities such as production, manufacturing and mining were 
exclusively the province of state governments.  Cases like Wirtz and Wickard were 
thus quite radical in their expansive conception of the Commerce Clause, because 
they first articulated Congress's power to regulate persons and things twice and  
thrice removed from interstate commerce.  But this is entirely different than saying  
Congress can regulate someone with no relation to interstate commerce at all—
such as a person who builds a machinegun from scratch in his garage—so long as 
there is an otherwise valid statute that covers his activities.  There is nothing in 
Wirtz, Wickard, Lopez, or in any of our cases—not even buried in a footnote—
suggesting this understanding of the Commerce Clause is plausible.  Quite the 
contrary, the Supreme Court has always entertained as-applied challenges under the 
Commerce Clause.  In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, for example, 
the Court found Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was valid “as applied . . . to 
a motel which concededly serves interstate travelers.”  In Katzenbach v. McClung, 
the Court found the same statutory provision valid “as applied to a restaurant 
annually receiving about $70,000 worth of food which has moved in commerce.”  
If the dissent in McCoy were right, we would have only needed one case to say 
Title II is valid, period.  There would have been no need to consider—as the Court 
did—whether a single hotel or restaurant had a sufficient nexus to interstate 
commerce, and could thus be federally regulated.  Wickard was also an as-applied 
challenge:  Had the Court deemed regulation of the business of agriculture a 
sufficient basis for upholding the application of the Agricultural Adjustment Act to 
Filburn, there would have been no need for it to analyze how his particular 
activities affected interstate commerce. 
Id. at 1140-42 (internal citations omitted). 
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Indeed, it is hard to believe the Court would ever eliminate as-applied 
challenges for one particular area of constitutional law.  As Professor 
Fallon explains, ‘[a]s-applied challenges are the basic building blocks of 
constitutional adjudication.’  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and 
Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 
1328 (2000).  An as-applied challenge asks a court to consider whether a 
statute's application to a particular litigant is a valid one.  Whereas the 
‘enterprise concept’ is only relevant when a party is regulated in relation 
to a large industry or enterprise, whether a given statute can 
constitutionally be applied to a claimant is an inquiry that occurs in every 
constitutional case:  In order to raise a constitutional objection to a 
statute, a litigant must always assert that the statute's application to her 
case violates the Constitution.  But when holding that a statute cannot be 
enforced against a particular litigant, a court will typically apply a 
general norm or test and, in doing so, may engage in reasoning that 
marks the statute as unenforceable in its totality. In a practical sense, 
doctrinal tests of constitutional validity can thus produce what are 
effectively facial challenges. Nonetheless, determinations that statutes 
are facially invalid properly occur only as logical outgrowths of rulings 
on whether statutes may be applied . . .  Professor Fallon also notes that 
‘[t]raditional thinking has long held that the normal if not exclusive 
mode of constitutional adjudication involves an as-applied challenge.’ . . 
.  We therefore cannot agree with the bold assertion in the McCoy dissent 
that an as-applied challenge is inapposite in cases such as this.107 
In Stewart, the defendant was convicted of, among other things, five 
counts of unlawful possession of a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(o).108  In concluding that § 922(o) was unconstitutional as applied to 
Stewart, the Court targeted the failure of the Government to establish 
federal jurisdiction.109  The jurisdictional failure was two-fold:  the lack of 
a jurisdictional element in the statute,110 and the fact that the machinegun 
had not traveled in or substantially affected interstate commerce.111 
Other appellate courts have not directly confronted the issue of as-
applied challenges the way the opinions by Judges Trott and Kozinski do.  
These courts have taken various approaches to the sufficiency of 
jurisdiction in federal criminal statutes.  For the First Circuit, a statute with 
                                                          
 107. Id. at 1142 (internal case citations omitted). 
 108. Id. at 1134. 
 109. Id. at 1134-42.  The Stewart opinion also noted that § 922(o) failed the first and 
fourth prongs of the Morrison test; that is, possession of a machinegun, without more, was 
not commercial or economic in nature.  Id. at 1136.  Moreover, the effect of Stewart’s 
possession of homemade machineguns on interstate commerce was attenuated.  Id. at 1137. 
 110. See id. at 1138 (explaining that “section 922(o) contains no jurisdictional element 
anchoring the prohibited activity to interstate commerce”). 
 111. Id. at 1135-36.  “Notably absent from this provision is any jurisdictional 
requirement that the machinegun has traveled in or substantially affected interstate 
commerce.”  Id. at 1134. 
BAKER 10/3/2005  1:39 PM 
562 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:545 
a jurisdictional element is sufficiently distinguishable from Lopez and 
Morrison.112  Even the lack of a jurisdictional element may not, for some 
courts, invalidate the statute.113 
On the other hand, the Third Circuit has indicated that a jurisdictional 
element alone may not suffice.114  The Second Circuit also questioned the 
sufficiency of a jurisdictional element,115 but it ultimately ruled that per 
curiam circuit precedent precluded an as-applied challenge.116  In contrast, 
the Eighth Circuit, citing Stewart, specifically held that a federal statute 
adopted under the Commerce Clause was unconstitutional as applied.117 
To this author, the question of as-applied challenges seems rather 
straightforward, based on Bass118 as relied upon in Lopez.119  First, the 
prosecution has the burden of proving all the elements of the crime.120  If 
the statute has a jurisdictional element based on the Commerce Clause, 
then the prosecution must prove that element of the case.121  If in the 
particular case, as a matter of law, it is clear from undisputed facts that the 
prosecution cannot prove the connection required under the Commerce 
                                                          
 112. See United States v. Capozzi, 347 F.3d 327, 335-36 (1st Cir. 2003) (finding that the 
Hobbs Act did not exceed Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because the statute 
specifically “applies only to that specific subset of robberies and extortions that affect 
interstate commerce”). 
 113. See Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding 
the lack of a jurisdictional element insufficient to render the Endangered Species Act 
invalid); United States v. Ali Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding 
that the lack of a jurisdictional element in an anti-bootlegging statute did not render the 
statute invalid). 
 114. See United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding the 
jurisdictional element in a statute criminalizing the possession of child pornography too 
attenuated to render the statute constitutional). 
 115. See United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2003) (questioning “whether 
the mere existence of jurisdictional language [in a child pornography statute] purporting to 
tie criminal conduct to interstate commerce can satisfactorily establish the required 
‘substantial effect’”). 
 116. See id. at 90 (“[W]hen Congress regulates a class of activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce, ‘[t]he fact that certain intrastate activities within this class, such 
as growing marijuana solely for personal consumption, may not have a significant effect on 
interstate commerce is . . . irrelevant.’”) (quoting Proyect v. United States, 101 F.3d 11, 14 
(2d Cir. 1996)). 
 117. Klingler v. Dir. Dep’t of Revenue, 366 F.3d 614, 617 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
the Commerce Clause did not allow Congress to use the Americans with Disabilities Act to 
prevent Missouri from charging an annual fee for parking placards for the disabled). 
 118. 404 U.S. 336 (1971). 
 119. See 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995) (finding the Gun-Free School Zones Act flawed 
because the statute lacked the necessary jurisdictional element linking the criminalized 
conduct with interstate commerce) (relying on Bass, 404 U.S. at 337, 347, 349). 
 120. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979) (forbidding “criminal 
conviction except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier 
of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the offense”); In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (requiring explicitly that the prosecution prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt each element of a charged crime before a defendant may be convicted). 
 121. See, e.g., United States v. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Because the 
‘substantially affect interstate commerce’ requirement is a jurisdictional element [of a 
crime], it must be proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”) (citations omitted). 
BAKER 10/3/2005  1:39 PM 
2005] LIMITING THE EXPANSION OF FEDERAL CRIMES 563 
Clause, then the court should rule that the constitutionally required 
jurisdiction does not exist in the particular case122—even though the statute 
may be constitutional on its face.  
III.  FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION:  AN OVERLOOKED SEPARATION OF 
POWERS ISSUE 
In Lopez and Morrison, the Supreme Court focused on the fact that the 
statutes involved did not regulate commercial activity.123  Nevertheless, the 
Court’s citations blurred the commercial-criminal distinction.  In order to 
explain the test under the Commerce Clause, Lopez reviewed the long line 
of the landmark Commerce Clause cases—cases which generally have 
nothing to do with crime.124  Lopez then looked to Perez v. United States,125 
a criminal case, to describe the categories of commercial activity covered 
by the Commerce Clause.126  By emphasizing Perez, the Court perpetuated 
the blurring of criminal with commercial activity produced by that 
precedent. 
As pointed out in New Deal lawyer Robert Stern’s critique of Perez, the 
great Commerce Clause cases had nothing to do with crime.127  Prior to 
Perez, the Supreme Court often separated criminal cases based on the 
Commerce Clause by the use of narrow statutory construction in order to 
avoid the constitutional issue.128  Indeed, Bass, relied on by Lopez to 
explain the case-by-case approach, was such a case.  Assuming, however, 
that the Court is not prepared to repudiate Perez, federal criminal cases can 
still be better distinguished from commercial cases by focusing on the issue 
of separation of powers between the judiciary and Congress. 
In sum, federal statutes that actually regulate commerce do not require 
federal courts to allow an Executive Branch department, namely the DOJ, 
                                                          
 122. See, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1246 (1st Cir. 1996) (explaining 
that “if [the jurisdictional] element is not satisfied, then [the defendant] is not guilty”) 
(citing United States v. Ryan, 41 F.3d 361, 363-64 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
 123. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (emphasizing that the criminal statute at issue has 
“nothing to do with ‘commerce’”); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) 
(declining to expand the scope of the Commerce Clause to victims of violent crime because 
of the non-economic nature of the regulation). 
 124. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553-67 (outlining the Court’s development of Commerce 
Clause powers based on challenges to regulated commercial activity). 
 125. 402 U.S. 146 (1971). 
 126. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 150). 
 127. See Robert Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited—The Federalization of 
Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271, 273 (1973) (observing in 1972 that Congress had 
only just begun to assert its commerce powers “in a criminal law context”). 
 128. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350-51 (1971) (holding that a federal 
statute which was unclear as to whether the criminal act must be connected with interstate 
commerce must be read narrowly so as to require that a nexus with interstate commerce be 
shown as an element of the offense). 
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to impose repeatedly on their jurisdiction.129  Federal criminal statutes 
require repeated invocations of federal court jurisdiction.  Every criminal 
indictment, based on a federal criminal statute, that on its face or as-applied 
exceeds the power of Congress, asks a federal court to exercise jurisdiction 
it lacks.130  Even if the statute is constitutional on its face, it does not follow 
that the particular application is constitutional, as discussed above.131  In 
non-criminal cases, the Executive Branch need not always, or even 
normally, resort to a federal court in order to enforce the particular 
statute.132  While the Executive Branch may use civil suits in federal courts 
to enforce federal statutes, it must file criminal cases whenever it seeks to 
enforce a criminal statute.133  For every criminal case, a court must get 
involved, even for the overwhelming percentage of defendants who enter 
guilty pleas. 
The non-criminal enforcement of Commerce Clause-based statutes 
generally involves the delegation of regulation by the Congress to the 
Executive Branch.134  When a new statute is enacted, it may face a 
constitutional challenge as to the authority of Congress to pass the 
particular act.135  Once that matter is definitively settled, and assuming it is 
settled in favor of Congress’s power, then the Executive Branch is the 
primary actor with the role of the federal courts being generally secondary, 
at most.  Congress is happy to delegate to the Executive Branch, which is 
generally willing to accept the delegation.  The President, at the time of the 
law’s enactment, accepts the delegation by signing the particular 
                                                          
 129. See generally California v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 369 U.S. 482 (1962) (holding that 
antitrust policy entrusted to the judiciary could not be frustrated by an administrative 
agency); Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) 
(“Judgments within the powers vested in courts by [Article III] may not lawfully be revised, 
overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Government.”). 
 130. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.3 (6th ed. 
2000) (noting that there are constitutional limitations on federal power and jurisdiction and 
that Congress “should not be able to exercise its power to create exceptions to federal 
jurisdiction that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, or other 
Constitutional limits”). 
 131. See supra Part II. 
 132. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(upholding a federal agency’s reasonable interpretation of its governing statute and 
enforcement measures taken pursuant to such interpretation and implementing regulations). 
 133. The DOJ has attempted to “regulate” corporations by publicizing prosecutorial 
guidelines which “encourage” adoption of “compliance programs.”  John S. Baker, Jr., 
Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 
316 (2004). 
 134. See generally United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (discussing the 
delegation of regulatory power to administrative agencies and the weight duly enacted 
administrative regulations carry). 
 135. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (noting that, 
although Congress has the authority to override and supersede judicially created rules, such 
authority does not exist where those rules are required by the Constitution). 
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legislation.136  The role of the Supreme Court and other federal courts is 
limited to deciding whether Congress’s legislation infringed on the powers 
of the President, of the states, or on the rights of individuals.137 
While federalization of crime involves the powers of Congress vis-à-vis 
the states and individuals, it also involves relationships between the three 
branches of the federal government.  As between Congress and the federal 
courts, the issue is similar in some sense to the question of as-applied 
challenges, discussed above,138 in that both concern the jurisdiction of 
federal courts.  That discussion, however, focuses on whether the 
prosecution has established that the facts of the particular case bring it 
within the scope of the Commerce Clause.  While similar to that issue, the 
separation of powers issue involves the institutional relationship between 
Congress and the federal courts. 
The separation of powers issue between Congress and the federal courts 
should be distinguished from what is called the delegation, or actually the 
non-delegation, doctrine.139  As discussed in Mistretta v. United States,140 
the non-delegation doctrine is derived from separation of powers.141  In 
considering the constitutionality of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the 
majority opinion, as well as Justice Scalia’s dissent, says that Congress did 
not violate the non-delegation doctrine by giving broad power to the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission to establish sentences.142  However, the two 
                                                          
 136. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3 (requiring any bill passed by both Houses of 
Congress to be presented to the President for approval or veto); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 946-51 (1983) (holding that presentment is required bicameral approval of legislation). 
 137. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Due respect for the 
decisions of a coordinate branch of Government demands that we invalidate a congressional 
enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional 
bounds.”). 
 138. See supra Part II (discussing as-applied challenges). 
 139. During the 1930s, it was common for a challenge to a new congressional statute to 
involve unconstitutional delegation challenges, in addition to Commerce Clause challenges.  
See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating an 
administrative regulation under the non-delegation doctrine); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 
293 U.S. 388 (1935) (reaching the same result).  Until the last decade, neither case seemed 
viable.  When Lopez opened the way for challenges under the Commerce Clause, a similar 
effort to revive non-delegation challenges—emerged, but was quashed—at least for now.  
See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc., 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001) (reaffirming the broad 
power of Congress to delegate to the Executive Branch).  These delegation cases, however, 
involved only the relationship between Congress and the Executive. 
 140. 488 U.S. 361, 371-75 (1989) (upholding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
established by the United States Sentencing Commission on the basis that Congress neither 
delegated excessive legislative power to the Commission nor violated separation of powers 
in the Commission’s design). 
 141. See id. at 413, 415-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 142. See id. at 374 (finding that the limited delegation of legislative power to the United 
States Sentencing Commission did not violate separation of powers because it was 
“sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional requirements”); id. at 416 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (agreeing that Congress did not violate the non-delegation doctrine to the 
extent that Congress guided the Sentencing Commission’s discretion by an “intelligible 
principle”). 
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opinions view the separation of powers challenge differently.143  Although 
the majority rejects the separation of powers challenge, its opinion does 
note “serious concerns about a disruption of the appropriate balance of 
governmental power” and the placement of this “peculiar institution” 
within the judiciary.144  Justice Scalia’s opinion goes further by insisting 
that the U.S. Sentencing Commission violates separation of powers because 
it is an entity which does nothing more than make law, as opposed to 
making rules as part of some other function.145 
Congress generally has little occasion to delegate power to the federal 
judiciary.  The major exception concerns the Rules Enabling Act,146 in 
which Congress gave to the Supreme Court power to prescribe rules of 
federal procedure.147  As Congress has created more federal criminal 
statutes with attenuated connections to the Commerce Clause, it has in 
effect delegated to the federal judiciary regulatory matters that would 
otherwise be handled by an administrative agency.  The lower federal 
courts are creatures of Congress,148 as are administrative agencies.149  
Separation of powers principles, however, prevent Congress from treating 
lower federal courts like administrative agencies.150 
Congress finds it convenient to enact broad legislation with minimal 
detail to be filled in by administrative agencies.  If the agencies are 
“independent”—that is, of the Executive—Congress can more easily 
                                                          
 143. Compare id. at 384 (suggesting that the U.S. Sentencing Commission does generate 
separation of powers concerns despite its constitutionality), with id. at 420 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (insisting that the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s authority to essentially create 
binding laws violates separation of powers principles). 
 144. Id. at 384. 
 145. Id. at 420-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 146. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2004) (authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate federal 
rules of practice, procedure, and evidence); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART 
AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 608 (5th ed. 2003) 
(noting the need for uniformity in federal rules of procedure and the effectiveness of 
granting to the Supreme Court the power to create such rules). 
 147. See FALLON, supra note 146, at 608-19 (discussing the development of the rules 
creation process over the years and concerns about the process and the role of the Supreme 
Court). 
 148. See Sheldow v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) (finding that courts created by 
statute are limited in jurisdiction to that which the statute confers). 
 149. See FALLON, supra note 146, at 46-47 (stating that administrative agencies and their 
adjudicatory mechanisms originate from Congress’s Article I legislative authority, not from 
Article III judicial authority). 
 150. Congress has been able to influence the operation of administrative agencies not 
only through the practice of broad delegation, but also by separating out independent 
agencies.  Administrative agencies within the Executive Branch are subject to the control of 
the President.  But see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-93 (1988) (upholding a 
congressionally imposed “good cause” limitation on the firing of an independent counsel).  
The Supreme Court has allowed Congress to restrict the power of the President to remove 
appointees to independent agencies.  See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 
631-32 (1935) (upholding a section of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Act which 
limited the ability of the President to dismiss FTC Commissioners on policy grounds). 
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pressure them.151  Even as to agencies nominally under the control of the 
Executive, Congress has devices to prod the agency towards the desired 
direction,152 even though its favorite tool—the Congressional veto153—has 
been formally excluded as unconstitutional.154  As long as Congress can, to 
some extent, control the administrative agencies, it is inclined to avoid 
political accountability by being too specific in statutes.155 
The actions of and threats by members of Congress with respect to 
criminal sentencing reflect that Congress, or at least influential members 
thereof, in some ways view the federal courts like administrative agencies.  
First, Congress created the U.S. Sentencing Commission as an 
“independent” agency within the judiciary, to avoid making the tough 
political judgments about sentencing.156  Thus, when Congress wanted to 
register its outrage over Enron and similar corporate scandals, it simply 
enacted “get tough” directions to the U.S. Sentencing Commission.157  
Predictably, when Congress said “jump,” the administrative agency 
complied.  When some members of Congress did not approve of sentences 
handed down by some federal judges, they basically limited the discretion 
of judges to make downward-departing judgments.158 
                                                          
 151. See Stephen H. Yuhan, The Imperial Presidency Strikes Back:  Executive Order 
13,233, The National Archives, and the Capture of Presidential History, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1570, 1598-1600 (2004) (discussing the factors which contribute to an executive agency’s 
independence from the Executive and Legislative branches). 
 152. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 130, at § 7.4 (discussing the history behind 
congressional investigations of the Executive Branch and the benefits of such investigations 
to the democratic process).   
 153. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948-60 (1983) (striking down the one-house 
legislative veto of executive decisions because it violated the principles of bicameralism and 
separation of powers). 
 154. Id. at 959. 
 155. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 421 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(noting that Congress will avoid making divisive political choices when given the 
opportunity). 
 156. See id. at 422 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“By reason of today's decision, I anticipate 
that Congress will find delegation of its lawmaking powers much more attractive in the 
future. If rulemaking can be entirely unrelated to the exercise of judicial or executive 
powers, I foresee all manner of ‘expert’ bodies, insulated from the political process, to 
which Congress will delegate various portions of its lawmaking responsibility. How 
tempting to create an expert Medical Commission (mostly M.D.’s, with perhaps a few 
Ph.D.’s in moral philosophy) to dispose of such thorny, ‘nowin’ political issues as the 
withholding of life-support systems in federally funded hospitals, or the use of fetal tissue 
for research”). 
 157. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 805, 116 Stat. 745, 802 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994) (distributing guidelines and policy statements to all federal 
courts in order to establish clear directives concerning sentencing).  As noted by the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, this section “directed the Commission to review and amend, as 
appropriate, the guidelines and related policy statements to ensure that the guidelines that 
apply to organizations in this chapter ‘are sufficient to deter and punish organizational 
criminal misconduct.’”  Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 68 Fed. Reg. 
75,339, 75,358 (Nov. 1, 2004). 
 158. See, e.g., Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of 
Children Today Act (PROTECT Act) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 
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Congress certainly has authority to craft careful legislation which 
restrains the sentencing discretion of judges.159  That is tough work, 
however—work that Congress does not seem interested in doing.  Rather 
than doing its own job of legislating, it acts as if it is attempting to dictate 
particular sentences.  It can do so by providing for mandatory sentences.160  
As long as Congress or the U.S. Sentencing Commission provides a range, 
however, sentencing judgments must be judicial ones.161  Indeed, in 
mandatory sentencing, no judicial judgment is involved.  Congress could 
more carefully craft the definition of crimes, which in turn could produce 
more tightly graded sentencing, or Congress could adopt mandatory 
sentences.  Otherwise, Congress’s recourse, if it does not like a judge’s 
sentencing judgments, is to impeach him or her.162  But again, that is hard 
work that Congress seems uninterested in doing.163 
Congress has left great discretion to the Executive in prosecution by 
enacting broad and often ambiguous criminal statutes.164  For a long time, 
and even still, the federal courts cooperated with prosecutors in stretching 
the meaning and coverage of federal crimes.  Insofar as the federal 
judiciary has been compliant, the DOJ has refrained from pressuring the 
judiciary through Congress.  As exemplified by its reaction to the Booker 
case, however, the DOJ is prepared to pressure judges who do not comply 
with its view on sentencing.165  Due in large part to the fault of federal 
                                                          
(eliminating some judicial discretion in sentencing and requiring stronger minimum 
sentences in an attempt to protect children from abduction and sexual exploitation). 
 159. Cf. FALLON, supra note 146, at 319-20 (noting Congress’s power to limit the 
jurisdiction of federal courts).   
 160. See, e.g., PROTECT Act § 401 (strictly limiting downward departures from 
sentences prescribed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines). 
 161. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 759 (2005) (Breyer, J., with Rehnquist, 
C.J., O’Connor, Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting the majority as to the remedy) 
(finding that the congressional policy of reducing sentencing disparities that underlies the 
Sentencing Guidelines “depends for its success upon judicial efforts to determine, and to 
base punishment upon, the real conduct that underlies crime of conviction”). 
 162. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-3 (granting the House of Representatives the sole power 
of impeachment of federal officers and the Senate the sole power to try all impeachments); 
see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1993) (refusing to interfere with the 
Senate’s decision to have evidence taken by a committee of the Senate rather than by the 
full Senate). 
 163. Consider Nixon, where the Senate created a committee to “try” the impeachment of 
Chief Judge Nixon, who had already been convicted of a federal crime.  Nixon, 506 U.S. at 
226-28.  The Senate as a body was apparently not interested in spending much time in a trial 
when the outcome was pre-ordained by the judge’s criminal conviction.  Id. 
 164. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of 
Statutes:  Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1994) (suggesting 
there are considerable logistical and political motivations for Congress to leave many of its 
bills vague and imprecise). 
 165. See Assistant Attorney General Christopher A. Wray, Statement Before the House 
Committee on the Judiciary Concerning Federal Sentencing After Booker 6-7 (Feb. 10, 
2005) [hereinafter Wray Statement] (imploring Congress to take action to prevent improper 
and inconsistent factors from informing judges’ sentencing decisions), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/press_room/testimony/2005 
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judges, federal prosecutors have been able to ignore the limits on 
separation of powers. 
The federal judiciary is at its strongest and least subject to criticism in 
the defensive use of judicial review.  That is, when the Supreme Court rules 
that it cannot constitutionally exercise jurisdiction, it does not need the 
Executive to enforce its judgment.166  Refusing jurisdiction is certainly not 
an act of abandonment of its responsibilities and can serve to protect the 
federal judiciary as a separate institution.167  Thus, Marbury v. Madison 
established the Supreme Court’s authority by denying its power to judge 
the case on the merits.  Chief Justice Marshall ruled the Court could not 
exercise the jurisdiction given by Congress.168  Had the result been 
otherwise, namely issuing an order against Secretary of State Madison’s 
efficacy, it would have depended upon enforcement by the President, 
which would not have happened.  The Court’s judgment in Marbury, which 
did not require the President’s cooperation, protected the judiciary.169 
The Supreme Court could more clearly distinguish than it has in Lopez 
and Morrison between criminal and non-criminal statutes under the 
Commerce Clause.  It could do so by focusing on the Executive’s 
continued attempts to expand federal court jurisdiction through liberal 
interpretations of criminal statutes.  In cases where criminal defendants 
make an as-applied challenge to a statute, a federal court could explain that 
the indictment exceeds the court’s jurisdiction.170  In doing so, it would not 
jeopardize federal legislation insofar as it actually regulates commerce.  
Rather, the Court would merely be refusing to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction.171 
IV. THE VIOLATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE “DETAILING” OF 
DOJ ATTORNEYS TO THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Booker, which 
has thrown the federal sentencing issue back to Congress, offers an 
opportune occasion for considering the practice of DOJ detailing its 
lawyers the Senate Judiciary Committee.  Booker has created upheaval in 
federal sentencing by making the mandatory sentencing guidelines only 
                                                          
_3785_fedSentencAfterBooker021005.pdf 
 166. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 167. See id. at 177. 
 168. Id. at 177-80. 
 169. See id. at 177. 
 170. See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text (emphasizing that the Supreme 
Court can limit the Executive’s ability to apply federal criminal law by refusing to exercise 
jurisdiction where the law fails to meet constitutional requirements as applied to the 
particular defendant). 
 171. In statutes that provide both civil and criminal penalties, only the civil penalties 
would be available, assuming the statute was otherwise constitutional.    
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advisory.  As of this writing, the DOJ is urging Congress to act quickly and 
to do so in a way that favors federal prosecutors in the balance of power as 
applied to sentencing.172  The DOJ’s influence, however, extends beyond 
the process described in civics books, whereby the Executive Branch 
proposes legislation to particular members of Congress, who oblige by 
sponsoring the legislation.  The DOJ also has its own lawyers assigned to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee where they draft criminal legislation.173 
“Inside the beltway” it is no secret that various Executive Branch 
agencies “detail” their employees to congressional committees.174  The 
practice does not simply involve the Executive Branch inserting itself into 
the workings of a separate branch.  Prominent senators have insisted that 
Executive Branch agencies supply them with more detailees and describe 
the practice as “mutually beneficial.”175  When in 2003 the Office of 
                                                          
 172. See Wray Statement, supra note 165, at 14 (urging Congress to act quickly to 
prevent sentencing judges from relying on the Supreme Court’s Booker decision to impose 
more lenient sentences than the guidelines require). 
 173. See, e.g., Suzanne Nelson, Grassley Assails Detailee Cuts, ROLL CALL, Oct. 6, 2003 
(describing the practice of “detailing” in which executive staffers are seconded to 
congressional offices), available at http://www.lexis.com. 
 174. See id. (postulating that the Office of Personnel Management’s proposed 
regulations could have the “far-reaching” effect of limiting the widely-used practice of 
detailing).  The Office of Personnel Management’s proposed regulations would have barred 
any executive agency from detailing an executive employee to the legislative branch without 
first receiving the approval of the Office of Personnel Management.  Detail of Government 
Employees From the Executive Branch to the Legislative Branch, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,054 
(Sept. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Detail of Government Employees].  Congress subsequently 
rejected the proposed amendments.  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 
108-447, div. H, tit. VI, § 638, 118 Stat. 2809. 
 175. See 149 CONG. REC. S13120 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 2003) (statement of Sen. Grassley).  
Mr. GRASSLEY.  Mr. President, I rise to speak on the amendment Senator 
Domenici and I offered to address a regulation recently proposed by the Office of 
Personnel Management; a regulation that is wrong-headed. 
Congress and the executive agencies have long enjoyed a mutually beneficial 
relationship where executive branch employees are detailed to congressional 
offices. These details typically exist for 1 to 2 years. 
As a result, the executive branch has an opportunity to have its employees learn 
about the legislative process and oversight activities. Likewise, the legislative 
branch has an opportunity to utilize the expertise of executive branch employees. 
Everyone benefits. 
The regulation proposed by the Office of Personnel Management will inevitably 
ruin the benefits of this long-term practice. 
The regulation proposed by the Office of Personnel Management for example, 
seeks to reduce to 6 months the time that a detailee can spend in Congress. This is 
too short a time for even the most industrious of detailees to understand the 
intricacies of the legislative process and contribute to that process. 
Moreover, this regulation attempts to limit the activities in which executive branch 
employees can engage while under the direct supervision of a Congressional office 
in an effort to micro-manage from afar. This is unacceptable. 
Senator Domenici and I have offered an amendment to prohibit the use of any 
funds for the implementation of this regulation that will severely reduce the 
number, availability and benefit of executive branch detailees to the legislative 
branch to the detriment of all. 
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Personnel Management (“OPM”) proposed to limit the practice, Congress 
blocked those regulations.176  To the unsophisticated “outside the beltway” 
onlooker, however, the obvious question would seem to be simply this:  
“Doesn’t such an arrangement violate the separation of powers between the 
Legislative and Executive Branches?”177 
As discussed above, the federalization of crime can involve jurisdictional 
issues which threaten the separation of powers among the three branches.178  
Sometimes the federal judiciary condones what should be understood as 
violations of separation of powers.  Thus, despite the Supreme Court’s 
decisions of unconstitutionality in Lopez and Morrison, federal courts often 
give expansive interpretations of federal crimes which effectively create 
new criminal law when separation of powers should prevent that from 
occurring.179  The current legislative process, however, also involves the 
lack of separation of powers between the Executive and Legislative 
Branches.180  While the public may unwittingly support the federalization 
of crime, the symbiosis between the DOJ and the Senate Judiciary 
Committee has driven the process.181 
As Congress has attempted to wrest control of criminal law policy by 
federalizing crimes and then curtailing the discretion of federal judges in 
                                                          
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. 
I yield the floor. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER.  Without objection, the amendment is agreed to. 
The amendment (No. 1949) was agreed to. 
Id.  Mr. Grassley’s amendment to reject the proposed amendments was adopted.  
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, div. H, tit. VI, § 638. 
 176. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, div. H, tit. VI, § 638.  Section 638 
provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, none of the funds appropriated or 
made available under this Act or any other appropriations Act may be used . . . to 
implement the proposed regulations of the Office of Personnel Management to add 
sections 300.311 through 300.316 to part 300 of title 5 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, published in the Federal Register, volume 68, number 174, on 
September 9, 2003 (relating to the detail of executive branch employees to the 
legislative branch).   
Id. 
 177. The proposed regulations recognized the possibility of separation of powers 
violations, as well as conflicts of interest, but nevertheless would allow detailing of 
Executive Branch personnel to Congress, although on a more limited basis.  See Detail of 
Government Employees, supra note 174, at 53,054. 
 178. See supra Part III. 
 179. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 N.S. (5 Wheat.), 76 (1820); see also JULIE R. 
O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME:  CASES AND MATERIALS 26 (2001) 
(“Arguably, a central myth of federal white-collar crime jurisprudence is that there are no 
‘federal common law crimes.’”).  Professor O’Sullivan argues that the prohibition on 
criminal common law is fundamentally based on the separation of powers.  Id.  Common 
law making in the criminal realm implicates fundamental separation of powers questions 
because it involves “a dangerous concentration of power for life tenured judges to both 
propound the law and to preside over its interpretation and administration.”  Id. 
 180. See, e.g., Detail of Government Employees, supra note 174, at 53,054. 
 181. See id. 
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sentencing, it has generated other separation of powers issues.  In 
Mistretta,182 the Supreme Court rejected the separation of powers argument 
that challenged the creation of the U.S. Sentencing Commission and its 
location within the Judicial Branch.183  Booker, while primarily about the 
right of jury trial as to every element of a crime, also involved separation of 
powers.  Booker did not reconsider the holding in Mistretta.184  It involved 
other issues of separation of powers.185   
The strange, two-part decision in Booker, with two different five-four 
majorities, created a result that only Justice Ginsburg fully supported.186  
The four-four split between the other justices involved separation of 
powers concerns.187  The first four justices—those who ruled that 
sentencing enhancements not based on jury fact-finding violated the right 
to jury trial—would have otherwise left the congressional sentencing 
system in place.188  They dissented, on separation of powers grounds, to the 
second majority’s decision on the remedy.189  The four justices who 
disagreed on the jury-trial issue, along with Justice Ginsburg, took the 
position that the guidelines became merely advisory.190  In this split, the 
first four gave priority to Congress on the issue of sentencing.191  The 
                                                          
 182. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 183. Id. at 390 (“[W]e can discern no separation-of-powers impediment to the placement 
of the Sentencing Commission within the Judicial Branch.”). 
 184. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 755 (2005) (Stevens, J., with Scalia, 
Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting the majority as to the constitutional question) 
(cautioning that the Court’s holding in Booker does not undermine its prior separation of 
powers holdings in Mistretta).  The Court explained that the decision in Mistretta “was 
premised on an understanding that the Commission, rather than performing adjudicatory 
functions, instead makes political and substantive decisions.”  Id.  The Court reasoned that 
Congress’s promulgation of the sentencing guidelines, which was similar to the creation of 
the federal rules of evidence, was a delegation of non-adjudicatory powers and did not 
intrude on the authority of the judiciary.  Id.  Additionally, the Court recognized that the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, which exercised a quasi-legislative function and not an 
adjudicatory function, did not violate Article III.  Id. 
 185. See id. at 754-55 (Stevens, J., with Scalia, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., 
constituting the majority as to the constitutional question) (concluding that requiring 
“sentencing factors to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt” would not violate 
separation of powers doctrine as “an unconstitutional grant to the Sentencing Commission 
of the inherently legislative power to define criminal elements”). 
 186. See id. at 746 (Stevens, J., with Scalia, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting 
the majority as to the constitutional question); id. at 756 (Breyer, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., 
O’Connor, Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting the majority as to the remedy). 
 187. See id. at 755 (Stevens, J., with Scalia, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting 
the majority as to the constitutional question). 
 188. See id. (Stevens, J., with Scalia, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting the 
majority as to the constitutional question). 
 189. See id. (Stevens, J., with Scalia, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting the 
majority as to the constitutional question). 
 190. See id. at 757 (Breyer, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Kennedy & Ginsburg, 
JJ., constituting the majority as to the remedy). 
 191. See id. at 751 (Stevens, J., with Scalia, Souter, Thomas & Ginsburg, JJ., constituting 
the majority as to the constitutional question) (concluding that “[p]rovisions for such 
enhancements of the permissible sentencing range reflected growing and wholly justified 
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second four hypothesized that Congress wanted judges to have an 
important role in sentencing.192 
Regardless of whether it is preferable for judges to have a large role in 
sentencing, it was quite implausible for Justice Breyer to contend that the 
sentencing reform, which included the sentencing guidelines, embodied 
such a policy.193  The supposed goal for creating the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was to eliminate 
disparity in sentencing.194  To do so, Congress attempted to reduce the role 
of the jury by creating a system in which the sentencing judge could 
enhance sentences based on facts found by the judge.195  That much might 
have appeared to exalt the role of the judge.  In fact, however, the 
sentencing guideline system in practice forced judges to enhance 
sentences.196  Congress removed sentencing discretion from both the jury 
and the judge, a point Congress reinforced by adopting the Feeney 
amendment as an attempt to prevent downward departures.197  Congress is 
attempting, as much as it is able, to control the sentencing process and to 
increase the likelihood and length of imprisonment. 
The effect, if not the original goal, of sentencing reform has been to 
lengthen sentences.198  Even if disparity were eliminated in federal 
sentencing, however, the system created by Congress has generated a 
greater disparity between sentences in federal and state courts for the same 
                                                          
legislative concern about the proliferation” of crime). 
 192. See id. at 759-60 (Breyer, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Kennedy & Ginsburg, 
JJ., constituting the majority as to the remedy). 
 193. See id. (Breyer, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor, Kennedy & Ginsburg, JJ., 
constituting the majority as to the remedy). 
 194. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983) (asserting that sentencing disparities can be 
traced directly to the considerable discretion the law affords judges and parole authorities).  
See generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform:  The 
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 
228-31 (1993) (providing that the sentencing guidelines were designed to minimize the 
“unwarranted disparity” in sentencing wrought by judges’ unchecked power to determine 
sentencing for criminal convictions). 
 195. See Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311, 
328-30 (2003) (emphasizing that the advent of the federal sentencing guidelines replaced a 
sentencing system based on the “ideological or emotional dispositions” of judges or juries 
with a mechanical system based on mathematical “grids prepared in advance by the 
sentencing commissions”). 
 196. See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing:  No End to Disparity, 
28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 190 (1991) (emphasizing that under the sentencing guidelines 
courts no longer retained the traditional ability to control the sentence imposed but rather 
must impose the sentence the prosecutor recommends provided that reliable evidence 
supports the facts). 
 197. See 149 CONG. REC. H2420 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep. Feeney) 
(“[T]his amendment addresses long-standing and increasing problems of downward 
departures from the Federal sentencing guidelines.”). 
 198. See Ian Urbina, New York’s Federal Judges Protest Sentencing Procedures, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at B1 (reporting that the Feeney amendment has upset many judges, 
who argue that the amendment violates the separation of powers and forces judges to 
enhance sentencing). 
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crime.199  That would be an acceptable disparity if federal prosecution 
reached only those offenses that primarily involved injury to a federal 
interest.  As is well known, however, the expansion of federal criminal law 
has largely involved a duplication of state crimes.200  As federal criminal 
law duplicates more state crimes, the potential for disparity clearly 
escalates.  The disparity in sentencing between those prosecuted in federal 
versus state court for the same crime reflects the efforts of Congress and 
the DOJ to take away from state legislatures, judges, and juries control of 
the police power in their communities.201 
The DOJ’s intrusion into the Judiciary Committee to draft federal 
criminal law and sentencing policy should be seen as a clear violation of 
separation of powers.  The Executive controls the enormous power of 
prosecution.202  In addition, the Executive can advocate before Congress to 
pass laws to favor the policies it backs.203  Also, federal prosecutors can 
present the judge with their views on the proper sentence for an individual 
defendant.204  If, however, the DOJ was to “detail” one of its attorneys to a 
district judge to work as a law clerk, it would obviously be an outrageous 
violation of the criminal defendant’s rights.  One might debate whether 
such a situation would involve merely a conflict of interest or an actual 
violation of due process.  Clearly, however, such a practice would violate 
separation of powers. 
The fact that the DOJ details lawyers to work on the staff of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee may or may not strike one as equally outrageous.  If 
the focus is due process, it may not seem to be outrageous because the 
attorney is working on legislation, not on decisions in individual cases.  At 
                                                          
 199. See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 2, at 27-30 (illustrating that the prison 
term imposed for a federal crime is likely, on average, to be longer than the prison term 
imposed for a similar state crime). 
 200. See id. at 7 (explaining that concerns over the increase in crime in the 1960s and 
1970s pushed Congress to federalize criminal conduct that was previously left to exclusive 
state regulation). 
 201. See id. at 14-15 (postulating that Congress’s justification for expanding federal 
criminal law arises not out of the states’ structural inability to address the problem but rather 
because such federal regulation is “politically popular”). 
 202. But see Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 796 (1987) (providing 
that in certain circumstances prosecutorial power is not limited exclusively to the Executive 
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 203. See Andrew D. Goldstein, Note, What Feeney Got Right:  Why Courts of Appeals 
Should Review Sentencing Departures De Novo, 113 YALE L.J. 1955, 1965 (2004) 
(commenting that Jamie Brown, the Acting Assistant Attorney General, in lobbying for the 
Feeney Amendment, had “vastly” overstated many of the concerns of downward departures 
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disparity in the federal sentencing system). 
 204. See Heaney, supra, note 196, at 190 (underscoring that “[t]he prosecutor’s control 
over the ultimate sentence increases the prosecutor’s bargaining power in the plea 
negotiations”). 
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least the proposed OPM regulations recognize the potential for conflicts of 
interest and the separation of powers issues.205  The proposed regulations, 
however, would not prevent the practice.  Detailing DOJ attorneys to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, where they draft federal criminal legislation, 
is no different in terms of separation of powers from detailing DOJ lawyers 
to a federal district judge, where they would draft opinions for the judge.  
The fact that the former does not excite outrage as much as the latter (and 
why the latter would not occur) reflects that lawyers have been well-
educated in matters of due process but not in the principle of separation of 
powers. 
As the Federalist warned, the Congress represents the most serious 
threat to liberty under a democratic form of government.206  In practice, the 
only effective means of preserving separation of powers and, therefore, 
liberty “consists in giving to those who administer each department, the 
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist the 
encroachments of the others.”207  The federal judiciary certainly has the 
motives to enforce separation of powers by separating DOJ lawyers from 
the staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee.  Consistent with the “case and 
controversy” limitation of Article II, however, the judiciary must await the 
properly presented case. 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated by the ABA Task Force Report and the Federalist 
Report, federal criminal law has undergone a great expansion.  Regardless 
of whether this expansion actually benefits the public, it carries political 
benefits for members of Congress and the Executive Branch.  Naturally, the 
two political branches will not voluntarily forego those benefits.  It is 
precisely when these two branches join together to violate separation of 
powers that the federal judiciary should, in appropriately presented cases, 
enforce that fundamental constitutional protection of liberty.  This Article 
offers three possible strategies which might be employed in the appropriate 
cases.  First, defense attorneys might more often employ as-applied 
constitutional challenges to federal crimes even if they have been held to be 
facially constitutional.  Then, in ruling on federalism challenges to federal 
crimes, federal judges might find that such challenges can also be 
explained in terms of separation of powers as an unconstitutional expansion 
of federal court jurisdiction.  Finally, someone with constitutional standing 
                                                          
 205. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (highlighting the distinct separation of 
powers problems raised by the practice of detailing). 
 206. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 334 (James Madison, John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, 
writing as “Publius”) (Jacob Cooke ed. 1961). 
 207. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 246. 
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might decide to challenge the practice of detailing Justice Department 
attorneys to the Senate Judiciary Committee.  Success with one or more of 
these three strategies could have some impact on the relentless expansion 
of federal crimes. 
